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VIEWING THE PROPOSED SOUTH AFRICAN BUSINESS RESCUE 






Australia and South Africa share more than sporting rivalry. In legal terms there 
is much that has come from the common Anglo heritage. The company law 
regime in both countries has much in common. However, it is one matter to 
have common legislation it is another to have that legislation operate in the 
same manner given different social conditions and a different commercial 
environment. Further in more recent times it is likely to be the influences of a 
number of factors that will play a part in law reform in each country not just 
what happens in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless there is value in making 
comparisons of the legislative regime in each jurisdiction where the stated aims 
are the same and where one jurisdiction may have a history that may show how 
proposed legislation in another may operate. Such similarity may be found in 
the legislation proposed in the South African Companies Bill 2007 to enable 
business rescue.1 The Australian equivalent can be broadly found in Part 5.3A 
of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Like South Africa, Australia includes its 
corporate insolvency provisions in its general company law statute.2 This article 
seeks to make comparisons between the existing Australian regime and the 
proposed South African legislation. This article does not however engage in the 
convergence debate.3 It is not suggested here that legislation is nor indeed 
should, be converging towards some ideal that will be a preferable model in all 
 
* Dr Colin Anderson, Griffith Business School, Griffith University Australia. 
1  Companies Bill 2007 ch 6. 
2  Although there appears that there is a proposal in South Africa to bring all insolvency law 
within the one piece of legislation, this does not appear to be in accordance with the 
approach adopted in the Companies Bill 2007: see Burdette Comments on the Companies 
Bill appendix 7 to submission by TMA-SA on Draft Companies Bill 2007 at 4. 
3  This argument being that legislation in various jurisdictions should converge towards 
standard provisions – generally those adopted in the United States or the United Kingdom. 
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jurisdictions. What it does is to examine some aspects of the proposed 
legislation in South Africa and compare that to the equivalent Australian regime 
from an Australian perspective. By so doing it may assist in the debate in South 
Africa over how the legislation is framed as the experience in Australia may be 
useful as an indicator of issues to be considered.  
 
 
2 The background to 'business rescue' in Australia 
Prior to making any comment on the South African proposals from an 
Australian view, the background to the Australian legislation is discussed briefly 
below. This provides some context to the Australian provisions which assists in 
evaluating the themes in the legislation. The first point of note is that Australia 
does not have a separate insolvency statute but maintains its corporate 
insolvency provisions within its general Corporations Act.4 The legislation 
governing companies always had as a fundamental procedure liquidation 
provisions. The development of insolvency law in Australia did not necessarily 
occur in a coherent display of principle applicable to both individuals and 
corporations but more often as a series of specific issues dealt with when some 
form of crisis developed that needed to be managed. The notable exception to 
this occurred when the Australian Law Reform Commission examined 
insolvency law generally in its 1988 report.5 The separation of corporate and 
personal insolvency reflects the English heritage of Australian law in this area.  
 
 
2.1 Early developments – scheme of arrangement 
Australian company law generally (and its corporate insolvency laws in 
particular) has developed from statutes in individual states. For reasons to do 
with the interpretation of the Corporations power in the Australian Constitution, 
company law was until the 1980's left essentially as a state matter. Despite the 
 
4  See generally ch 5 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
5  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb. The current business rescue 
provisions are as a direct result of recommendations of that inquiry so it is no coincidence 
that they represent a more coherent and encapsulated procedure. 
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integration of commercial activity throughout Australia, company legislation did 
not always provide for consistent treatment even in matters of corporate 
insolvency.  
 
Specifically in relation to provisions aimed at 'rescuing' companies in financial 
difficulties, the earliest adopted procedure was the scheme of arrangement.6 
This was initially developed in the UK legislation through a series of pieces of 
legislation starting with the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act in 1870. 
By 1928 in the English legislation, the philosophical basis of the scheme of 
arrangement sections (as they currently exist in Australian legislation) had been 
established. The development of the sections in Australia followed almost 
directly from the English provisions.7 These types of provisions were adopted in 
many jurisdictions with an Anglo legal heritage and will be familiar as they are 
found in the current South African Companies Act 61 of 1973.8 When the 
Harmer Report recommended the adoption of a new form of corporate rescue it 
did not suggest that it replace the scheme of arrangement provisions rather that 
they needed to be kept to deal with reconstructions and for larger arrangements 
in insolvency.9  
 
 
2.2 Official management 
This form of insolvency administration was inserted in the State based 
Companies Acts and subsequently adopted in national scheme legislation. It 
was based upon the South African Judicial Management procedure. Unlike the 
South African provisions however the appointment of the official manager in 
Australia was done by a meeting of creditors10 rather than by the Court.11 In 
 
6  For a more detailed examination of the background of Schemes of Arrangement and their 
relationship to the business rescue provisions in Australia see Anderson 1999 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 107. 
7  Queensland inserted provisions equivalent to s 2 of the UK Act of 1870 in 1889 and New 
South Wales and Victoria followed in 1892. By 1937, all Australian states except Western 
Australia had adopted almost identical provisions to those of s 120 of the 1908 United 
Kingdom Act: see Pilcher, Uther and Baldock Australian Companies Act at 269.  
8  See ch XII and specifically s 311. 
9  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 57. 
10  See the former s 335 Companies Act 1981 (Cth). 
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many other respects the procedure was similar in both jurisdictions. The 
procedure has some common goals with the current business rescue 
procedure in Australia (referred to here as Part 5.3A)12 in that it is also 
designed to allow companies that are in financial difficulties to be saved but if 
this is not possible that they be wound up. However, at least in the Australian 
context, there was a major difficulty of the procedure which is not evident in its 
replacement in Part 5.3A in that official management required that the debts be 
paid in full within a set time. This was a major hurdle for insolvent companies. 
As a result of this requirement, it was noted by the Harmer Report13 that 
"official management is rarely attempted". The lack of usage of the procedure 
meant that there was little concern when these provisions were removed from 
the legislation on the commencement of Part 5.3A in 1993.14 It is notable that 




2.3 Development of voluntary administration 
Apart for the insertion of official management provisions in the Companies Acts 
no further legislative development took place in the area of arrangement or 
compromise until the 1980s in Australia. This interest in insolvency legislation in 
Australia was probably sparked again from developments in the United Kingdom 
where the process of review of insolvency law could be traced back to the mid 
seventies. As Fletcher and Crabb suggest:16
 
It is also worthwhile to recall that the reforms … were the product of an 
extended process of re-examination of the entire working of the 
insolvency law which began to gain in urgency in the period from 1975 
 
11  See in the South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427, 428 and 432. 
12  The Australian rescue procedure is encapsulated in Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). This part is often referred to as 'voluntary administration' but it should be noted 
that the part also contains provisions dealing with a 'deed of company arrangement' which 
is a rescue plan that may be adopted only as a result of the voluntary administration 
although creditors may instead vote in favour of a winding up of the company instead.  
13  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 47. 
14  See Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth). 
15  DTI Explanatory Memorandum Companies Bill 2007 14. 
16  Fletcher and Crabb Insolvency Act at 45-15. 
C ANDERSON  PER 2008(1) 
5/31 
                                           
onwards, as successive phases of economic recession brought about 
abnormally high levels of corporate and individual financial failures.  
 
No doubt the economic conditions in Australia were similarly the catalyst for the 
instigation of the Harmer Report. It is interesting to note in this regard that 
despite the delivery of the Harmer Report in 1988, it was not until the severe 
economic downturn of 1990 that legislation implementing the corporate reforms 
was introduced. In this sense the reform of the provisions relating to 
arrangements with creditors, with its emphasis on the continuity of the business 
and subsequent employment, was seen as a key feature of the response to 
corporate insolvency.17 It is not clear to this author if such economic conditions 
may be the driver for the interest in such procedures in South Africa. 
 
 
2.4 Developments since the implementation of Part 5.3A 
Since its implementation in 1993, the provisions in Part 5.3A remained 
relatively untouched until some recent amendments passed in August 2007. 
The government did receive a comprehensive review of the legislation in 1998 
when the legal committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory 
Committee (CASAC) presented a report on the operation of Corporate 
Voluntary Administration.18 Subsequently the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services undertook a general enquiry into 
Australia's insolvency law.19 The collapse of the Ansett group20 of companies in 
2001 in particular, was the impetus for the consideration by the Corporations 
 
17  The Harmer Report, supra n 5, did not recommend that voluntary administration replace 
the scheme of arrangement provisions. In par 57 the recommendation was that: "schemes 
of arrangement should be preserved for, in particular, larger private or public companies 
(although it is not suggested that this procedure should be limited to such companies)". 
18  Legal Committee of the CASAC Corporate Voluntary Administration Final Report June 
1998. This review made sixty recommendations but only some were subsequently adopted 
in the 2007 amendments. 
19  Some insight into where this very broad ranging enquiry may head can be found in the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee Issue Paper http://www.aph.gov.au/ 14 Feb.  
20  Details of the Ansett administration may be found at http://www.ansett.com.au. The airline 
went into administration on 12 September 2001. Although not a large company by world 
standards (debts were estimated at around $A2b) it was a significant company by 
Australian standards. It was also the country's second largest airline and was considered 
an icon in the aviation industry in a country that relies heavily on air transport. There were 
some 15,000 employees and perhaps most significantly there was a looming Federal 
election.  
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and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) on rehabilitating large 
enterprises.21 The Ansett case showed the difficulty of using Part 5.3A in 
relation to a larger company. One of the matters considered by CAMAC was 
whether the adoption of a corporate rescue model that provided for debtor in 
possession during the period of rescue and for entering into the procedure 
before a company is insolvent was required. Ultimately none of the reviews 
recommended that these matters be incorporated and accepted that the current 
provisions worked satisfactorily. It was believed that with relatively minor 
amendments the legislation could become flexible enough to cover larger 
insolvencies. This resulted in the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 
2007 being passed in August 2007. At the time of writing these changes – 
which are not fundamental – have yet to be proclaimed and hence are not in 
operation. As these amendments have just passed through the Parliament and 
are not yet in operation it may be some time before the predictions will be put to 
the test. This article deals with the Australian law as it currently exists and does 
not attempt to analyse the amendments not yet in force. 
 
 
3 The aims of the procedures 
The provisions dealing with corporate rehabilitation in Australia are contained in 
Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. In section 435A there are objects stated 
which apply to the whole of the Part. These state that the business property 
and affairs of the company are administered in such a way that maximises the 
chances of the company or as much of it as possible surviving. However if that 
is not possible the secondary object is that the return to creditors and members 
is better than would have resulted from an immediate winding up. These 
objects have been utilised by the courts on occasion to assist in interpretation 
of sections in Part 5.3A.22 It has been accepted that it is possible to use the 
procedure despite there being no intention to have the company or its business 
 
21  CAMAC Discussion paper http://www.camac.gov.au 14 Feb. 
22  See eg Australasian Memory v Brien (2000) 200 CLR 270 and Kalon  v Sydney Land Corp 
[No 2] (1998) 26 ACSR 593. 
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survive.23 Thus the second object is considered a worthwhile goal in itself so as 
to justify the adoption of the procedure in preference to moving directly into a 
winding up. The courts in Australia have been careful not to allow the Part 5.3A 
procedure to be used where there appears to be an ulterior purpose behind the 
appointment of an administrator by directors.24  
 
Set out in a proposed new South African Companies Act is a chapter 6 headed 
'Business Rescue'. The term 'business rescue' is proposed to be defined in 
section 130 as "proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation by its management of 
a company that is insolvent or may become insolvent". The definition then 
identifies the proceedings as temporary supervision of management with a 
temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or its 
property and the development and implementation of a plan to rescue the 
company (if approved). As with the Australian provisions these activities are to 
have objects which are stated as maximising the likelihood of the company 
continuing on a solvent basis or if not possible results in a better return for the 
company's creditors or shareholders.  
 
Therefore there are almost identical aims with both procedures. Each 
jurisdiction recognises the desirability of the company continuing in existence 
so that the legislation assumes that this is a desirable goal. Both jurisdictions 
appear to reject therefore the argument that corporate rescue legislation has 
the effect of adding to costs for creditors and is likely to be used strategically by 
management to delay or defeat creditors.25 It reflects the wide acceptance that 
the retention of the corporate entity or at least a significant portion of its 
business even though it may be insolvent adds value to society more generally 
 
23  In Dallinger v Halcha Holdings (1996) 14 ACLC 263 where Sundberg j held (at 268) that 
the machinery in Part 5.3A should be available "where, although it is not possible for the 
company to continue in existence, an administration is likely to result in a better return for 
creditors". 
24  Aloridge v Christianos (1994) 12 ACLC 237; Kazar v Duus (1998) 29 ACSR 321. 
25  Most influentially, see Jackson Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, and also Baird 1986 
Journal of Legal Studies 127. More recently there has been Baird and Rasmussen 55 
Stanford Law Review 751. None of this criticism has been effective though in persuading 
jurisdictions not to provide for corporate rescue in legislation. However it must be 
recognised that the form of the legislation does vary from that used in the US which is the 
source of most of this critical analysis.  
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and is a desirable form of insolvency legislation over straight liquidation.26 
Further there is recognition that even though the company may not continue in 
existence it is suggested that better returns may be gained by adopting the 
rescue procedure.27  
 
 
4 Commencement  
One area of relevance when comparing the proposed South African and the 
Australian systems is in relation to how the procedures are commenced. All 
corporate rescue systems have three distinct steps – commencement, 
investigation and development of plans, and decision making. It is possible to 
identify the commencement phase of the Australian provisions as being one 
that does not seek to evaluate the desirability of the company entering into the 
process. In common with other jurisdictions, the procedure is designed so that it 
is relatively simple to enter the procedure. Procedurally, the Australian 
voluntary administration process commences by the appointment of an 
administrator.28 The appointment of an administrator can be made by three 
distinct parties. Firstly the board of directors may appoint an administrator by 
way of a resolution provided that the board is of the opinion that the company is 
insolvent or about to become insolvent.29 Although no statistics are kept on the 
manner of appointment, the widely accepted view is that this is by far the most 
common manner in which an administrator is appointed in Australia. Secondly, 
the appointment may be made by a liquidator or provisional liquidator if he or 
 
26  It is possible to speculate on why the use of rescue type provisions has become popular –
at least in terms of them appearing in insolvency statutes around the world. It may be that 
economic development has resulted in less business activity in manufacturing as well as 
the growth in human capital. Each of these suggests that the value in an enterprise rests 
less on the physical assets and more in the personal expertise and knowledge that the 
staff and managers bring to the firm. It is more likely that this can be retained if the 
corporate structure is retained. 
27  It is more difficult to postulate a reason why this may be correct and a most likely 
explanation may be that it is not possible to predict prior to the attempt to rescue the firm 
whether it will be successful. Hence it may simply be a case of allowing for the rescue on 
the chance that it will succeed but if it does not, there are relatively few additional costs 
compared to an immediate liquidation. On the other hand the benefits from a successful 
rehabilitation are considerable and may outweigh these costs.  
28  See s 435C(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
29  See s 436A(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
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she thinks that the company is insolvent or about to become so.30 The only 
limitation here is that if the liquidator wishes to appoint himself or herself, leave 
of the court must be obtained. Finally, an appointment may be made by a 
secured creditor who has a charge over the whole or substantially the whole of 
the company's property if the secured creditor is entitled to enforce the 
charge.31 Where the company is already being wound up the appointment may 
not be made by either the board or the secured creditor. Somewhat unusually, 
in Australia there is no provision for a court to make an order that an 
administrator be appointed. The above three persons are the only ones who 
can make such an appointment. Neither shareholders nor ordinary creditors 
can effect an appointment of an administrator. This results in a practical sense 
of the board having the control of this type of appointment.  
 
The reasoning behind the Australian approach was the recognition of two 
separate features of corporate insolvency. One was the recognition that court 
based systems as adopted in jurisdictions such as the United States often led 
to delays and costly litigation that resulted in even smaller dividends for 
creditors.32 The aim was to avoid the dissipation of the company's remaining 
funds in such activities. At that time little consideration was given to the fact that 
the United States system did provide some relief in relation to those costs by 
allowing the debtor to remain in possession in many instances hence the day to 
day running of the company was not in the hands of a professional accountant 
as in Australia.33 The second reason for allowing the procedure to commence 
in this way was to ensure that the directors were able to deal with the 
company's insolvency in a swift and effective manner. The moral hazard 
 
30  See s 436B(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
31  See s 436C(1) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
32  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 54. 
33  The administration of the company is undertaken by a professional accountant who will 
charge not only for her or his services but also for employees, etc. the costs here will 
always include the time taken to learn about the firm and its operations. Thus there is no 
doubt that additional expense is the likely result. However it is generally seen as 
fundamental to the Australian regime that an independent qualified person be appointed to 
both run the company and report to creditors. As such there has been little support for a 
suggestion that Australia adopt a debtor in possession approach: see CAMAC Report 
http://www.camac.gov.au 14 Feb, which concluded (at 17) that "[m]ost submissions agreed 
that there was no compelling case for fundamental changes to Part 5.3A along the lines of 
the debtor in possession model". 
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associated with management of an insolvent company is well documented34 
and the Harmer Report recognised the fact that board will often hold out once a 
company approaches insolvency in the belief that there is an improvement just 
around the corner or that there is nothing to lose in continuing.35 The Harmer 
Report had sought to remove the incentive to continue the company by 
introducing a more effective regime to punish directors who allow the company 
to trade whilst it was insolvent whilst providing them with a means of dealing 
with the insolvency. Thus it was something of a carrot and stick approach in 
that the directors are open to liability where the company is allowed to trade on 
when insolvent but there is a simple cheap means of dealing with the 
insolvency.  
 
The proposed South African legislation provides for a 'business rescue'36 that 
may be commenced in one of three ways, by ordinary resolution of the 
shareholders, ordinary resolution of the board37 or by a court order.38 In relation 
to the appointment by the board of directors this has similarity to the Australian 
procedure. However it does not appear that the strict prohibition on insolvent 
trading that was introduced in Australia at the same time as the voluntary 
administration regime has been pursued in the South African provisions. 
Although there is a reformulation of the directors' duties in the proposed new 
legislation it does not directly prohibit directors allowing company trading whilst 
the company is insolvent as is done in Australia. Thus there may not be quite 
the same incentive to pursue the rescue option by directors.  
 
In relation to the appointment by the shareholders' resolution, this has echoes 
of the voluntary winding up procedure. This option was not adopted in Australia 
even though it was specifically considered by the Harmer Committee.39 The 
route to the procedure via a resolution of the board of directors seems a much 
 
34   See eg the discussion in Barondes 1998 George Mason Law Review 45 particularly at 48-
51. It may be noted that Barondes argues that such behaviour is not necessarily evident in 
empirical studies.  
35  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 53. 
36  See proposed ch 6 s 130, definition.  
37  Proposed s 132. 
38  Proposed s 134. 
39  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 64. 
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more direct one and it is unclear under what circumstances the shareholders 
would adopt this approach without some support from the board. That is not to 
suggest such a provision is not suitable as members may be more involved in 
South African companies than in Australia. There is in fact something of a gap 
in the Australian procedure in terms of how it deals with the shareholder 
interests in the company. The fundamental theme in the Australian provisions is 
that the shareholders have no proprietary interest left in the insolvent company. 
However it can be argued that this reflects more of a liquidation perspective of 
the insolvency procedure. That is, the shareholders may have no interest in an 
entity that is being wound up with no funds available for any stakeholders but 
the outside creditors, but a corporate rescue is more likely – if it is successful – 
to mean a continuing interest in the corporate entity from the shareholders. The 
approach in Australia also shows the emphasis placed upon director 
responsibility for the actions of the corporations. The legislation adopts a model 
that makes the board almost entirely responsible for the corporation with the 
other stakeholders40 reduced to outsiders.41 The Harmer Report rejected such 
a provision on the basis that –  
 
company law has reposed responsibility for the management of 
companies with the directors rather than the members.42
 
The commencement of the procedure by the court under proposed section 134 
is also a point of departure from the Australian procedure. Under the proposed 
section 134 an application requires that an 'insolvency event' must have 
occurred in relation to the company and the company must not have already 
entered the procedure. An insolvency event will have occurred if the company 
fails to satisfy a statutory demand, execution on a judgement against the 
company is returned unsatisfied or the court is satisfied the company is unable 
to pay its debts.43 If such an event has occurred then any affected person may 
apply to the court. An affected person is proposed to be a shareholder, creditor, 
 
40  Including members. 
41  In some respects this reflects a director primacy model of the company: see Bainbridge 
2003 Northwestern University Law Review 547. 
42  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 64. 
43  Proposed s 131. 
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registered trade union or employee who is not a trade union member.44 This 
will open up a wide range of stakeholders who may apply to the court. By 
allowing individual shareholders to apply it potentially opens up a large number 
of applicants as there appears to be no restriction on that right.45 In the case of 
the right of creditors, in Australia the Harmer Report specifically rejected an 
argument to allow them to apply to the court for an appointment of an 
administrator.46 This was based on the voluntary nature of the procedure and 
the potential delay and costs that may result because of the court procedure. In 
a subsequent review of the Part 5.3A procedure it was however 
recommended47 that the court be given power to appoint an administrator on 
an application by a creditor as an alternative to asking for the winding up.48 
This has not been taken up in the 2007 amendments.49 The South African 
approach of allowing creditors to apply does provide some opportunity for 
creditors to initiate action to deal with the insolvency of the company whilst at 
the same time providing for a potential rescue. It may be that in most situations 
the creditor will prefer a liquidation but the opportunity should not be denied as 
in Australia.50  
 
In the Australian system of voluntary administration, the procedure commences 
upon the appointment of the administrator.51 The proposed South African 
provisions provide that the business rescue proceedings begin when the 
company files with the Commission a resolution to place itself under 
supervision or when a person files an application to the court for an order.52 
 
44  As to be defined in proposed s 130. 
45  In Australia there is no right to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. 
However in relation to liquidation the right to apply by individual shareholders is restricted 
by the need to obtain leave of the court for a winding up in insolvency: see s 459P. 
46  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 65. 
47  By the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (CASAC). This is a government 
funded advisory group which advises on corporate and related law issues. It has now been 
re-named as the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC).  
48  Legal Committee, supra n 18 at par 7.8-7.9. 
49  Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth). 
50  A further inequity in the Australian provisions is the fact that a chargeholder whose charge 
is over the whole or substantially the whole of the assets may appoint an administrator but 
no other creditor may do so. For a discussion of the problems with this see Anderson 2001 
Insolvency Law Journal 4. 
51  See s 435C. 
52  See the proposed s 135. 
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What is of interest is that under the proposed section 132(3) in the South 
African regime is the fact that the company must appoint a supervisor within 
five business days after filing the resolution that the company begin the 
business rescue procedure. This suggests that the company may be within the 
business rescue regime without the control of the company being with the 
supervisor. It therefore provides the opportunity for something of a gap to be 
created of up to five business days during which the supervisor is not in place. 
It is unclear as to the impact of the decisions of the board of directors during 
this time. Under proposed section 143 it is the supervisor who is responsible to 
supervise and advise the management whilst the business rescue is in place 
but the ability to retrospectively do this (where the appointment is made five 
days later) is unclear. It may be desirable to resolve this by requiring the 




5 Supervision during the rescue process 
As with all rescue procedures there needs to be a period of investigation of the 
corporations business prior to making any decision as to the future. This period 
may be longer as in the North American models of rescue or shorter as in the 
Anglo-Australian models. There are various arguments for and against the 
shorter time frames adopted in Australia.53 The Harmer Report was clearly of 
the view that a short time frame was necessary in order to prevent abuse by the 
incumbent management of the company so as to protect the rights of creditors 
including secured creditors.54 This has resulted in the Australian provisions 
providing for a standard period of 28 days before the meeting of creditors to 
decide the future of the company.55 Recent amendments (not yet operable) 
 
53  Eg a longer period is likely to increase the chances of putting together a rescue package. 
One criticism that may be made of the Australian provisions is that in such a short time 
frame it is unlikely that the parties will be able to negotiate satisfactory outcomes. On the 
other hand a shorter time frame ensures that there is less chance for the management to 
use the length of time of the moratorium as a negotiating tool.  
54  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 98. 
55  See s 439A. Extensions are made for administrations commenced in December and 28 
days before Good Friday but this extension is for one further week. 
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have increased this period to 25 business days or effectively five weeks.56 This 
slight increase does not alter much in practical terms with the period still being 
a short one. It is possible to have the period extended by application to the 
court57 and this is a relatively common application. The period of the 
moratorium may also be effectively increased by adjourning the meeting of 
creditors which may be done for a period of up to 60 days.58 It is clear that the 
time frames contemplated in the South African business rescue procedure are 
of a similar duration though slightly longer. The procedure requires the 
publication of a business plan within 25 business days after the date on which 
the supervisor was appointed unless extended by the court or a majority of the 
voting interests.59 The meeting to decide the fate of the plan is to be held within 
10 business days after that publication.60 Thus the South African approach 
does fit closer to the Australian model than the North American approach and 
this is consistent with the other aspects of the scheme as well.  
 
 
5.1 Initial meetings 
There are other similarities between the systems as well in that there is an 
initial meeting of creditors in both jurisdictions. The meeting in the Australian 
system is held within five business days of appointment61 but again recent 
amendments have moved this to eight business days. The first meeting under 
the Australian system has two functions; one is to appoint a committee of 
creditors if the creditors decide to do so and to replace the administrator if the 
creditors vote to do so. There is no other function for that meeting and it cannot 
end the administration. The function of the first meeting of creditors under the 
 
56  Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) sch 4. It may be noted that this 
legislation is at the time of writing yet to be proclaimed and hence is not yet in force. Again 
the extensions in December and before Good Friday are also extended to 30 business 
days or six weeks. 
57  Under s 439A(6). 
58  By adjourning the meeting under s 439B(2) no decision is made and hence the voluntary 
administration will continue in accordance with s 435C. 
59  Proposed s 153(6). 
60  Proposed s 154(1). 
61  S 436E and Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) see sch 4.  
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South African62 proposal appears to be limited to the supervisor informing the 
creditors of the belief that a rescue is a 'reasonable prospect' and to appoint a 
committee of creditors.63 There appears to be no possibility of removal of the 
supervisor at this meeting as under the Australian scheme. The South African 
scheme also contemplates a meeting of employee representatives which 
serves a similar function to the first meeting of creditors.64  
 
This raises one significant difference between the Australian provisions and the 
South African approach. The Australian provisions generally create no special 
provisions for dealing with employees. In the recent amendments there has 
been specific consideration of the employees' position for the first time albeit in 
a limited manner. This was done by requiring the default position in any rescue 
plan to include the statutory winding up priorities65 unless specific approval was 
given by a vote of the employees or the court.66 It is clear that there has been 
concern as to the employees' position in the South African proposal. This is 
understandable as it has been the Australian experience that at times the 
employees' position in the decision-making process has been one of 
disadvantage.67 The South African approach is to elevate the employees in 
terms of rights being given under proposed section 147 as regards being 
consulted on the development of the rescue plan and to propose an alternative 
plan. Further protection is granted to employees through the proposed section 
139.68 The additional concern as regards employees reflects the different social 
structures and conditions that exist in each jurisdiction rather than any 
fundamental difference in the underlying approach.  
 
 
62  Note that it is proposed that the meeting must be held within 10 business days after 
appointment: see s 151. 
63  See proposed s 150. 
64  See proposed s 151. 
65  Provided in s 556 which provide for priority for employees wages superannuation 
contributions along with leave entitlements and redundancy payments.  
66  Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) sch 1. 
67  This has been because employees whose rights were not protected at least as well in a 
deed of company arrangement as in liquidation are required to incur the expense of 
applying to court to have the deed set aside even though such an order would be likely 
granted. 
68  Discussed below. 
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5.2 Investigations 
A critical function in both schemes is investigations of the company. In Australia 
the administrator is obliged under Division 4 in Part 5.3A to investigate the 
company's affairs.69 The administrator is assisted in this task by various 
provisions that require the directors to assist.70 The South African proposal 
deals with this issue by requiring investigation under the proposed section 144 
and the directors' assistance under proposed section 145. One difference that 
emerges from consideration of this issue is the fact that the Australian 
provisions are aimed at considering the interests of the creditors in the 
company being wound up. The emphasis in the South African proposal appears 
to be confined more to a consideration of the rescue plan. The proposal in 
section 144 is that the supervisor must if he or she concludes that there is no 
reasonable prospect for the company to be rescued must inform the court, 
affected persons and the company and apply for an order to discontinue the 
proceedings. It is clearly not within the purview of the procedure to allow the 
company to move seamlessly into liquidation.71 The Australian provisions are 
designed to make that transition as costless as possible72 and hence it is 
required that the administrator comments upon that option. This flexibility 
between the procedures for dealing with an insolvent company was a key 
feature of the Harmer Report which wanted to develop within the alternatives 
an easy way to move the company from the investigation stage to the 
procedure which best suited the particular circumstances. This feature was 
fundamental to the arrangement of Part 5.3A even though it is often 
overlooked. If a company cannot be rescued than if it remains insolvent the 
alternative is only liquidation hence there is logic in allowing that procedure to 
commence immediately. The South African proposals do allow for a supervisor 
to apply to the court for the winding up when there is no reasonable prospect of 
 
69  See particularly s 438A. 
70  A number of provisions require the directors to assist such as s 438B, 438C and 442A. 
71  Ie further steps are necessary before winding up can commence.  
72  At the second meeting of creditors the creditors can resolve that the company be wound 
up (s 439C) and if that happens the company is deemed to have commenced to be wound 
up under a creditors' voluntary liquidation with the administrator as the liquidator: see s 
446A. 
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rescue however it appears that this may not happen after the plan has been 
rejected as the business rescue proceedings are by the proposed section 
135(2)(b), deemed to end.73 There appears no other basis in the proposed 
chapter 6 or in proposed sections dealing with voluntary74 or court ordered 
windings up75 that will allow for a supervisor to apply for the winding up. This 
will presumably result in the normal procedures being required to commence 
the winding up. In this regard the Australian procedures do have some 
advantages given that in rejecting a rescue plan the creditors are suggesting 
that there is little prospect of saving the company and if it is insolvent the 
winding up course seems appropriate. Even if it is determined that the 
Australian approach is unsuitable, it would seem desirable that the legislation 
deal explicitly with what should happen if the plan is rejected. In this respect 
another factor that could be considered is whether a liquidator should be able to 




In any corporate rescue system there needs to be a circuit breaker that 
provides a breathing space whilst a consideration is given to the prospect of 
saving the company.  
 
In Australia as part of the moratorium provisions there is during the period of 
the administration a general prohibition on the rights of owners or lessors of 
property that is in the possession of the company.77 Because a major aim of 
the administration period is to provide the company with the opportunity to 
consider a rescue, the appointment of an administrator has a significant impact 
on the rights of unsecured creditors and this is manifested in a number of ways. 
Thus during the administration: 
 
73  The ending of the proceedings would also presumably terminate the right under proposed 
s 144(2) to apply to the court for winding up as this is operative "during business 
proceedings". 
74  Proposed s 29. 
75  Proposed s 30. 
76  By way of example see s 436B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
77  S 440C. See also Robinson 1996 Australian Business Law Review at 434-436. 
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• court proceedings against the company are automatically stayed without 
the written consent of the administrator or the court;78 
• the execution process if started cannot continue;79 and 
• any other attempt to enforce a judgement is barred.80 
 
The Harmer Report81 recommended the moratorium apparently on the basis of 
promoting an orderly dealing with a company's affairs.82 The principle which 
justified such a limited interference was considered to be based upon the –  
 
promotion of an orderly dealing with a company's affairs so as to 
enable a more beneficial realisation of assets on winding up or 
possibly the rehabilitation of the business of the company. 
 
As with other creditors, those who are secured by way of a charge may face 
restrictions on their rights once an administrator is appointed. The Harmer 
Report83 argued that there were three principles that justified the interference. 
These were: 
 
• promotion of an orderly dealing with the company's affairs; 
• recognition of the debtor's interests in the assets that are subject to the 
security; and 
• recognition that the particular asset that is subject of the security may be 
necessary for any reorganisation to be successful. 
 
The basic prohibition84 is against a person enforcing a charge on the property 
of the company during the period of the administration. This is subject to a 
 
78  S 440D. There is an exception for criminal proceedings or any others that are prescribed 
under s 440D(2). The section will only operate where what is being considered is really a 
claim against the company for if it is some other type of claim then s 440D will not be 
applicable: J & B Records v Brashs (1994) 13 ACSR 680. 
79  S 440G. 
80  S 440F. 
81  ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 56. 
82  Ibid at par 97.  
83  Ibid at par 96.  
84  S 440B. 
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number of exceptions in Division 7.85 One of the difficulties that has arisen is 
the fact that the legislation in this Division uses the term 'charge' rather then the 
more generic secured creditor. This distinction has been significant in placing 
limits on the rights of the administrator. In Osborne Computer Corporation Pty 
Ltd v Airroad Distribution Pty Ltd86 it was held that the term charge did not 
include a lien or pledge. These were regarded as possessory security only and 
hence being different in nature to a charge which implied a right even without 
possession. 
 
One secured creditor who can assert rights despite the appointment of an 
administrator is one having a charge over the whole or substantially the whole 
of the assets of the company.87 Potentially the exception88 may thwart the 
administration process as these secured creditors could generally act to 
appoint their own receiver. This has not proven to be the case. 
 
Under the South African proposal there is a general moratorium provided for in 
the proposed section 136. This provides that no legal proceeding against the 
company or in relation to its property may be commenced or proceeded with 
without the consent of the supervisor or the leave of the court.89 The South 
African proposal also provides that the company may only dispose of property 
in the ordinary course of business or in a bona fide transaction as approved by 
the supervisor.90 The subsection does also allow for the disposal as part of the 
implementation of the business rescue plan once it has been approved under 
section 155. Whilst this has similarities to the Australian provisions it does 
highlight one very significant difference between the two systems. The South 
African proposal provides for the duration of 'business rescue proceedings' to 
cease, inter alia, when a supervisor has filed a Notice of Substantial 
 
85  See specifically s 441A to 441E. 
86  Osborne Computer Corporation v Airroad Distribution (1995) 17 ACSR 614. 
87  Under s 441A. 
88  Where a holder of a charge has a charge over the whole or substantially the whole of the 
assets of the company. 
89  There are exceptions for set-off, criminal proceedings or those involving the company as 
trustee of property.  
90  See s 137(1).  
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Compliance with any business rescue plan91 that has been adopted under the 
proceedings. The Australian procedure has two distinct phases. The first is the 
voluntary administration procedure which has significant moratorium attached 
to it for all creditors and owners of property. This is the moratorium as 
described above. However once a rescue plan has been adopted by the 
second meeting of creditors, those provisions imposing the general moratorium 
come to an end.92 The operation of the rescue plan or deed of company 
arrangement as it is termed in the legislation, results generally in only 
unsecured creditors being bound. The secured creditors and owners of 
property in the possession of the company are at that time free to enforce their 
security or recover their property in accordance with their pre-appointment 
rights unless they have voted in favour of the deed or there is an order of the 
court.93 The proposed South African procedure appears to bind the rights of all 
persons in relation to the rights in respect of the company's property without the 
approval of the supervisor, as part of the rescue plan or an order of the court.94 
There is provision for rights to be exercised in accordance with an "agreement 
made in the ordinary course of the company's business"95 but it is unclear what 
that may be intended to cover as it seems to suggest an agreement made after 
the appointment of the supervisor for if not it would seem to allow the 
enforcement against the property of the company at any time. Where the 
company does dispose of property that is either secured or owned by another, 
the company is required to pay the amount received to the owner or secured 
creditor or provide security.  
 
As well as the moratorium that exists in the South African proposals any 
supplier to the company of products considered essential to the conduct of the 
business must continue the supply unless there is an agreement in relation to 
 
91  This is required under proposed s 155(7). It is not clear from that provision when that 
notice does need to be filed as it is when the plan has been 'implemented'. This may mean 
once it is in place or it may imply that the plan has been satisfactorily completed. The 
author could find no illumination on this point.  
92  Under the Australian procedure the voluntary administration under s 435C. 
93  See s 444D and s 444F. 
94  See proposed s 137(1)(b). 
95  Under proposed s 137(1)(b)(ii)(aa). 
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other terms or there is a court order.96 There is no such provision in the 
Australian procedure so that it appears this will make the procedure more 
debtor friendly than the equivalent Australian procedure. Further as part of the 
protection of employees theme that runs through the South African procedure, 
the employees continue to be employed on the same terms and conditions97 
except to the extent that: 
 
• changes occur in the ordinary course of attrition; 
• an approved business rescue plan provides otherwise; or 
• the employees and the company agree to different terms and conditions 
that benefit the company. 
 
Again this provides much more protection than appears under the Australian 
provisions. In the Patrick's case in Australia,98 the High Court made it clear that 
a fundamental aspect of the administrator's task was to operate the company 
as he or she saw fit and that accordingly even where there may was possible 
breaches of industrial legislation, it was not prepared to order that employees 
must be retained by the company during a voluntary administration. 
 
 
5.4 Role of supervisors 
In Australia the administrator in the voluntary administration procedure is given 
effectively total control over the company. The administrator has broad powers 
in terms of management as the power of other officers is suspended.99 In 
addition the administrator has the power to appoint and remove directors, as 
 
96  See proposed s 140. 
97  See proposed s 139(1)(b). 
98  Patrick Stevedores Operations (No 2) v Maritime Union of Australia 195 CLR 1; 27 ACSR 
53; 572 ALJR 873; 79 IR 339; 153 ALR 643; [1998] HCA 30 where Brennon cj, McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne jj stated (195 CLR at 38): "It is for the administrator, in the 
exercise of the discretionary powers conferred by section 437A, to decide whether or not 
to carry on the company's business and the form in which it should be carried on during 
the administration." 
99  Under s 437A the administrator has control of the company's business, property and 
affairs as well as the ability to carry on or terminate as well as sell the business. He or she 
may also perform any of the functions or powers of officers when the company is not in 
administration: see Brash Holdings v Shafir (1994) 12 ACLC 619. 
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well as execute documents on behalf of the company and do "whatever else is 
necessary" for the purposes of Part 5.3A.100 It may be noted that these powers 
exist only up to the point when the creditors decide the fate of the company 
though and any powers during a deed of company arrangement will depend 
upon the wording of the deed itself.101 There are in addition specific duties of 
the administrator in terms of reporting to the creditors as to the desirability of 
taking a particular course of action at the meeting as well as duties to report to 
regulatory authorities about the company activities where breaches of the 
Corporations Act become apparent.  
 
Beyond the specific powers and duties of the administrator there is the broader 
role that the administrator must play in the Australian system. The administrator 
must not only run the company's business but also act fairly between the 
creditors and if possible devise a plan for the company's future. All this must be 
done in a relatively short period of time. The supervision of the administrator is 
undertaken by the regulatory authority Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) as well as specifically by the court through the ability of 
aggrieved parties to apply to the court to have matters decided by the 
administrator reviewed.102 At the time of the introduction of Part 5.3A Australia 
had a regulated insolvency profession but the focus was upon liquidation not 
corporate rescue. There is no doubt that the development of the administration 
procedure placed new demands upon insolvency practitioners and hence there 
has been a review by ASIC in terms of its registration procedure.103 The role of 
the administrator is critical to the success or failure of the rescue regime in 
Australia. The administrator must have the confidence of both the creditors and 
the debtor company. The debtor will not use the procedure if the administrator 
does not have their confidence and a major point of the procedure – 
encouraging early dealing with the insolvency – will be lost. On the other hand 
the creditors must have confidence in the administrator in terms of any proposal 
to rescue the company, otherwise they will reject any plan proposed. Having an 
 
100  See s 442A. 
101  Howard v Mechtler (1999) 30 ACSR 434. 
102  See s 447E. 
103  See now ASIC Regulatory Guide 186 http://www.asic.gov.au/ 30 Oct.  
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administrator with very wide powers of control overcomes some of the criticism 
of the American model of rescue where the debtor remains in possession as a 
general rule.104
 
The South African proposal also places much responsibility on the supervisor. It 
is set out in proposed section 143 that the supervisor has the power "to 
supervise and advise the management of the company". It is also proposed 
that the supervisor has the power to veto or approve significant management 
decisions and authorise borrowings. Like the Australian administrator there is 
the power to remove managers and appoint others. It does appear though that 
the existing management will remain in place so that a cooperative model of 
management between the supervisor and the board is suggested by the 
proposal than is the case in Australia. This may be desirable given the need for 
cooperation in any successful rescue. It may result in greater numbers of 
entities continuing in existence although it also runs the risk of creditors being 
more suspicious of the procedure. As the supervisor is to be registered then 
this may reduce those concerns. One other aspect of the South African model 
is that the supervisor is to be an officer of the court whereas in Australia that is 
not the case. Again this is likely to increase the position of the supervisor in 
terms of his or her independence and perceived independence.  
 
 
6 Decision-making in the rescue process 
A final stage in any corporate rescue regime is the decision-making phase 
where the fate of the company is decided. As with the commencement 
procedures, there are alternative means of doing this in different jurisdictions 
and it is argued that the Australian model is somewhat simplistic in its 
approach. The Australian decision-making model relies exclusively on the 
creditors voting to either wind up the company, to place it under a deed of 
 
104  Bradley and Rosenzweig 1992 Yale Law Journal at 1052 state: "The social costs of 
Chapter 11 proceedings are well known. Bankruptcy law encourages corporate managers 
to reorganise their firms under court supervision, which effectively invites them to create a 
net equity position for stockholders by overstating expected cash flows and understating 
risk." 
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company arrangement or to simply return the company to its previous condition 
at a second meeting of creditors.105 The third option is not adopted in most 
cases so the creditors will be deciding the matter as either liquidation or a deed. 
The system therefore relies upon the creditors being able to make the correct 
decision as regards the future of the company and in this respect the 
information provided by the administrator is critical.106
 
It is interesting that a very pragmatic approach to the voting is adopted in 
Australia despite the decision being critical to the procedure. There is a division 
of the votes into class and number but there is no division based upon priority. 
Hence there is no division into classes as such.107 This results in a relatively 
quick decision. The method of voting is not specified clearly in the legislation in 
relation to voluntary administration and it is only in the Corporations 
Regulations made pursuant to the Corporations Act that the method is spelt 
out.108 The regulations provide for a vote to be put to the meeting with a simple 
majority in number and in value required to pass a resolution. If there is a split 
by way of different voting between the two groups, the chair of the meeting 
(who must be the administrator) has a casting vote. Where the casting vote is 
used, there are rights of appeal to affected parties.109 The aim as with many of 
the provisions in this Part appears to be to have a quick decision with minimum 
formalities and that if stakeholders feel aggrieved they should apply to the court 
for an adjudication and remedy. 
 
The South African proposal is for a meeting of the creditors "and any other 
holder of a voting interest"110 to consider the rescue plan. A voting interest is 
effectively defined under proposed sections 148(4) to (7) and extends to 
employees where they may be retrenched under the proposed plan or who may 
 
105  S 439A and 439C. 
106 ALRC Harmer Report http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 11 Feb at par 110-111. 
107  Recent changes to the legislation have enabled employees to vote specifically where any 
deed proposes to alter the statutory priorities on winding up in its distribution: see 
Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) sch 1. 
108  Specifically the convening and conduct of, and voting at, a meeting convened under Part 
5.3A is governed by reg 5.6.12 to 5.6.36A of the Corporations Regulations: see reg 5.6.11 
(2). See Young v Sherman [2001] NSWSC 1020 at par 84; (2001) 40 ACSR 12. 
109  S 600A-C. 
110  As defined under proposed s 130. 
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have their conditions adversely affected under the plan. It also includes secured 
creditors only to the extent of their shortfall in security. These definitions are 
somewhat different to the Australian provisions where employees are not 
treated as a separate group and hence may only vote if considered to be a 
creditor. Again this shows the employee protection theme in the South African 
proposals. There is no definition of creditor in the Australian Corporations Act 
and hence it takes on its ordinary meaning. In addition in Australia, secured 
creditors may vote in the creditors' meeting under section 439A without 
surrendering their security.111 The South African proposals seem more in line 
with general insolvency principles in this regard.  
 
The decision on a rescue plan in respect of the South African proposal appears 
to be decided in a negative manner. Under proposed section 155 the plan is 
defeated if it is opposed by the holders of more than 50% of the voting 
interests. It is not clearly stated whether this is number or value but the 
reference to interests may suggest value. The plan is also defeated if opposed 
by more than 25% of the 'independent creditors'. This group is defined112 as 
any creditor including employees provided they are not related to the company, 
a director or the supervisor. This shows, much like the Australian decision-
making process, a desire to have the adoption of any rescue plan to be decided 
quickly as there is no division into classes and no need for further court 
approval. However unlike the Australian provisions which, as noted above, 
ignore shareholder interests, proposed section 155 will require a vote of 
shareholders or a class of shareholders where the plan "affect[s] the interests 
of any class of shareholders". Approval here will require a simple majority. 
There may be some clarification needed as to what is meant by affecting a 
class of shareholders but it does provide for a broader range of plans to be 
adopted than is possible under the Australian provisions.113
 
 
111  See generally reg 5.6.24 of the Corporations Regulations and in particular 5.6.24(4). 
112  See proposed s 130. 
113  Where a proposal involves arrangements with shareholders in Australia it can only be 
achieved through the Scheme of arrangement provisions in Part 5.1 of the Corporations 
Act. 
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Another feature of the South African proposal which is not allowed for under the 
Australian provisions is the option of the supervisor to seek a vote to prepare a 
revised plan.114 Further, this may be done through a vote by the holders of any 
voting interests at the meeting.115 There is no specification as to how this vote 
is to be taken and hence it does not appear to require the approval of 75% of 
"independent creditors' voting interests" in the manner that the plan approval 
does. 
 
In Australia there is an emphasis on having the company wound up when the 
deed is rejected by the creditors.116 Although it is possible for the meeting to be 
adjourned117 there are only three alternatives provided for at the meeting of 
creditors and none of those specifically involve an extension of time to consider 
a revised rescue plan. As a result it may be expected that the South African 
approach may result in more plans being adopted than is the case in Australia. 
It may result in more strategic behaviour though, by supervisors in conjunction 
with company management to delay liquidation. Such a problem could be 
overcome if there is a strong court reaction to such situations and the regulation 




This article has made some comparisons between the Australian corporate 
rescue provisions and those proposed to be adopted in South Africa in the 
Companies Bill 2007. Whatever the particular content of the legislation it seems 
that the aims of the legislation and that proposed in South Africa are almost 
identical. This of itself is significant given that there is debate over the 
appropriateness of specific corporate rescue legislation at all. The comparison 
above results in two themes emerging as differences between the approaches 
in each jurisdiction. First, there is a clear concern in the South African 
 
114  See proposed s 156(1). 
115  See proposed s 156(1)(b). 
116  Under s 439C there are only choices to wind the company up or simply return it to its 
previous position if the deed of company arrangement is rejected. 
117  Under s 439B(2). 
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provisions with the position of employees which is not apparent in Australia. 
That is not to suggest that the Australian provisions ignore employees 
completely but in South Africa it is proposed that their involvement will be more 
direct and are recognised throughout as being in a special position vis a vis 
other creditors. On the other hand there appears to be less concern in South 
Africa with the position of secured creditors than is evident in the Australian 
provisions. Concern about the support for the procedure by institutional lenders 
is possibly at the core of the stronger position of secured creditors in the 
Australian legislation.  
 
Second, the proposed South African provisions do not facilitate transition to 
winding up in the same manner as the Australian provisions. There is within the 
South African proposal a genuine attempt to give the company every chance at 
developing a rescue plan by allowing for alternative proposals to be developed. 
There is no direct transition after the rejection of a plan to winding up as there is 
in Australia. The Australian provisions are structured more to provide for 
liquidation as a direct alternative for creditors rather than proposals for an 
alternative plan. This is also reflected in the style of reports provided to the 
creditors. The South African proposals do not divide the procedure clearly into 
a decision-making stage and the period whilst the company is operating under 
the rescue plan. The Australian provisions provide clearly for a break between 
a period where the creditors have yet to make a choice about the company's 
future and the period once a plan (or deed of company arrangement) has been 
adopted. The legislation clearly divides these periods in terms of major issues 
such as the moratorium the power of the administrator and so on.  
 
In many respects the South African model of rescue as proposed does cover 
many similar areas as identified in the Australian legislation and these include 
aspects of the supervisors position, the periods for holding meetings and so on. 
There are sufficient similarities to suggest that much will be common in the 
experience if they are adopted into the legislation. However differences will 
remain and it will be interesting to review the procedure in the coming years to 
see if the scheme is as popular as it is in Australia.  
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